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DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING UNDER THE
INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT
With the recent passage of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Act,' Indiana has become the twenty-fifth state to require bargaining between teachers and school boards.' The Art, which continues the
trend of legislative structuring of public employment labor relations,
attempts to protect both the interests served by collective bargaining and
the conflicting interests served by local control of education.
As in the private employment relationship, mandatory collective bargaining is often thought to be needed to equalize the employees' bargaining power in contract negotiations.' Also, by providing a channel of communication it may serve to minimize the employees' need for recourse to
strikes or other concerted activities' as a tool for gaining concessions in
employment relations.5 A legislative guarantee of bargaining rights, expressed in terms of a scope of bargaining over which the employer must
bargain in good faith, can promote labor peace between employees and
willing and perhaps recalcitrant employers alike.'
Public sector labor relations pose problems, however, to which the
structure of private sector bargaining is not responsive.7 A second and
1. IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4551 to -4564
(Supp. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. Sections of the Act referred to in

this note are from the session law, Pub. L. No. 217, [1973] Ind. Acts 1080.
2. BNA GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. [hereinafter cited as G.E.R.R.] 51:501-21 (Ref.
File, 1973). Oregon subsequently became the 26th state to mandate bargaining, id. at
51:4611. California, Kansas and Nebraska require the parties to meet and confer rather
than bargain, a system under which "the outcome of public employer-employee d-scussions depends more on management's determinations than on bilateral decisions by

'equals.'"

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL, RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 100 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as
LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES]. Prior to the passage of the Act, collective bargaining

was permitted in Indiana. Gary Teachers Union, Local 4, AFT v. School City,
Ind. App. -,
284 N.E.2d 108 (1972).
However, it was not a matter of right. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969).
3. See § 1, NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), cf. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR.,
THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 13 (1971)

[hereinafter cited

as

WELLINGTON & WINTER].

4. Besides the formal strike, examples of concerted disruptive activities include the
slow-down and the "sick-in." See IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(p) (1973), IND. ANN. .STAT.
§ 28-4552(p) (Supp. 1973).
5. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 13.
6. A middle position between mandatory bargaining and impermissible bargaining
is mandatory "meet and confer" with bargaining permitted if the parties so agree. This
approach is preferred by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
See LABOR-MANAGEMENT PoLICIES, supra note 2, at 99.

7. [T]he social costs of collective bargaining in the private sector are principally economic and seem inherently limited by market forces. In the public
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competing concern in the public sector is that collective bargaining decisions between employees and public administrators can overreach and
restrict voters' determination of community affairs.' To the extent that
collective bargaining supplants the voters' control over governmental decisions, the ability of the community to influence its representatives is
diluted.9 In an attempt to preserve the effectiveness of representative
government, legislatures have withheld bargaining rights by reserving
items over which management retains discretion."
Indiana's bargaining act attempts to strike a compromise between
these competing policies. To "alleviate various forms of strife and unrest,"1 1 teachers and school boards are mandated to negotiate over certain
"Subjects of Bargaining."' 2 To preserve school board responsiveness to
community interests, the scope of bargaining is restricted by a statutory reservation of management rights." Problems arise, however, because a
sector, however, the costs seem economic only in a very narrow sense and are on
the whole political.
WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 14-15. See also notes 48-50 infra & text accompanying.
8. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 139-40. It has traditionally been felt
that governmental determinations of political priorities, particularly in budget allocations,
should be responsive to the desires of the electorate as a whole, rather than to special
interest groups such as labor unions. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in
the Public Sector, 10 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 357, 363 (1972). As a result, statutory limitations upon bargaining rights have been included as a part of many public labor relations
acts on the rationale that it does make a difference in the public sector how an employment decision is made. Doherty, Public Employee Bargainingand the Conferral of Public Benefits, 22 LAB. L.J. 485 (1971). "What may be at stake is further dilution of representative government." id. at 491.
9. Hearingson H.R. s2532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Subcomn.
on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 474-75
(1972).
Placing school boards and teachers in parity may thus "skew the results of the
'"normal" American political process'" by elevating one interest group over all others in
the community. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 25. The distortion is most
obvious when unions possess the strike threat. Id. at 167. However, collective bargaining itself "(the strike apart) is a method of channeling and underscoring the demands
of public employees that is not systematically available to other groups." Id. at 169.
Although introducing collective bargaining undoubtedly changes the relative power
distribution among interest groups in the community, the conclusion of Wellington and
Winter that such change is a "distortion" is a political value judgment open to challenge.
See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GOVERNMIENT 274, 282 (J. Loewenberg & M. Moskow eds.
1972).
10. See G.E.R.R. 51:501-21 (Ref. File, 1973).
Absent statutory restrictions, the scope of bargaining in the public sector will
be determined by the same factors as in the private sector, e.g., union strength in relation
to that of the employer. Gerhart, The Scope of Bargaining in Local Government Labor
Negotiations, 20 LAD. L.J. 545, 550 (1969).
11. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1 (1973), IND. ANN. (STAT. § 28-4551 (Supp. 1973).
12. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1973). See
also IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973).
13. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1973).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
disputed item may fall within the definitional ambit of both the bargaining rights clause and the management rights provision. The legislature
has created problems for the Indiana Education Employment Relations
Board1 4 and for the courts by failing to indicate how disputes falliffg
within this area of overlap are to be resolved. This note will examine the
bargaining provisions of the Act and will suggest an approach for Indiana
boards and courts to take in resolving conflicts in this area.
PROBLEMS IN DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
BARGAINING UNDER THE INDIANA ACT

Four interacting sections of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Act are applicable in defining the statutory scope of bargaining.
Not only will each of these provisions need to be construed independently,
but there must be some resolution of their apparently conflicting interrelationship which results in some items appearing to be both bargainable

and nonbargainable.
The Act limits the duty to bargain collectively in terms of the bargainable subject matter. Section 3 provides that "school employers and
school employees shall have the obligation and the right to bargain collectively the items set forth in Section 4.

. .

."'

The § 4 formulation,

"salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related fringe benefits," '
constitutes the limits of the school board's duty to bargain; that is, it
describes what is mandatorily bargainable, not what is permissibly bar-

gainable. By mutual agreement, the negotiating parties nuzy decide to
bargain over the much wider scope of subjects listed in § 5 of the Act."'
Further,

§

3 of the Act prohibits conflict between the negotiated contract and state or

federal statutes. IND. CoDu- § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).
Other indirect methods of limiting bargaining include requiring legislative approval
of the negotiated agreement's provisions, see, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-10(b) (Supp.
1973), and nullifying negotiated contracts that would require deficit spending, see, e.g.,
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).

14. This board was created by § 9 to administer the Act. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-9
(1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4559 (Supp. 1973).
15.

IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3

(1973),

IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).

Furthermore, § 2(n) of the Act provides that
"bargain collectively" means the performance of the mutual obligation of the
school employer and the exclusive representative to meet at reasonable times to
negotiate in good faith with respect to items enumerated in section 4 of this
chapter ....
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(n) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(n) (Supp. 1973).
16. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. ISTAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1973).

The
section further provides that "[a] contract may also contain a grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances . . . ." Id. Such an
item would appear to be only a permissive subject of bargaining if the word "may" also

applies to the act of bargaining.
17. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973).

Per-

missive subjects of bargaining, which are also mandatory "subjects of discussion," include
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For many Indiana school districts, however, the § 4 categorization
of items subject to mandatory bargaining will not be all-inclusive. A
separate grandfather clause, unique among state bargaining laws, 8 preserves to school employee organizations the right to bargain over "any
items included in the 1972-1973 agreements between any employer school
corporation and the employee organization
While §§ 3, 4 and 5 make several items either mandatorily or permissibly bargainable, a competing provision concomitantly restricts the scope
of bargaining. Sections 3 and 6(b) reserve to the school employer certain
rights with which the negotiated contract may not "conflict." 2 Broadly
working conditions, other than those provided in section 4; curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching methods; selection, assignment
or promotion of personnel; student discipline; expulsion or supervision of students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations ....
Id. These permissive subjects of bargaining. help limit the § 4 mandatory subjects, "salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related fringe benefits," IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4
(1973), IND. ANN. ISTAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1973), on the assumption that a given item
cannot be both a permissive and a mandatory subject of bargaining. Yet it is unclear,
for example, how the § 4 items can be other than "budget appropriations" under § 5.
18. See G.E.R.R. 51:501-21 (Ref. File, 1973).
19. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973).
Both the structure and the wording of this proviso are problematical. Appended to
a list of permissive subjects of bargaining, the grandfather clause appears to describe
mandatory subjects in addition to those listed in § 4. However, the duty to bargain
established in §§ 2(n) and 3, and the grounds for invoking the statutory impasse procedures refer only to § 4 items. Presumably, the failure to indicate clearly that the § 5
grandfather clause bargaining rights are of equal stature with those of § 4 resulted from
legislative oversight and can be remedied administratively.
A more serious problem is the meaning of "items." One summary of contract provisions negotiated prior to the passage of the Act counted 59 types of items. A. SMIrH,
INDIANA

PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

UNIONISM

AND

COLLECTIVE

NGOTIATIONS

26-29

(1971)

[hereinafter cited as SMITH]. Interpreting the many contracts to determine bargainability will require an early determination on such questions as whether a previously
negotiated class size of thirty means that class size in general is a bargainable "item,"
or only a class size of thirty.
Inclusion of the grandfather clause served to win the support of teachers' organizations for an otherwise narrow scope of bargaining. See Brickner, The Status of Public Employee Barganinhg,22 LAB. L.J. 492, 495 (1971).
20. Section 6(b) provides:
School employers shall have the responsibility and authority to manage and
direct in behalf of the public the operations and activities of the school corporation to the full extent authorized by law. Such responsibility and activity -shall
include but not be limited to the right of the school employer to:
(1) direct the work of its employees;
(2) establish policy;
(3) hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees;
(4) suspend or discharge its employees in accordance with applicable law;
(5) maintain the efficiency of school operations;
(6) relieve its employees from duties because of lack of work or other
legitimate reason;
(7) take actions necessary to carry out the mission of the public schools
as provided by law.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. iSTAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1973).
Section 3 provides:

464
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worded, these management rights appear to include virtually every right
already granted school corporations under the General School Powers
2
Act. '
Several problems will inevitably arise in trying to interpret and harmonize these various provisions. Threshold questions will involve a determination of which items are definitionally embraced within the sections
of the statute mandating or allowing bargaining. One inquiry in this area
involves the interpretation of the phrase "salary and wage related fringe
benefits" which are mandatory subjects of bargaining under § 4.22
No contract may include provisions in conflict with . . . school employee rights

as defined in section 7(a) [6(a)] of this chapter, or . . . school employer rights
as defined in section 7(b) [6(b)] of this chapter.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973). The wording
appears to be unique among state bargaining laws.
Section 3 also forbids conflict with "any right or benefit established by federal or
state law .... ." Id. An unresolved issue is the degree of "conflict" which this section anticipates as permissible. For example, bargaining is specifically permitted over
"student discipline," IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp.
1973), yet, in the same -session that produced the bargaining act, the General Assembly
enacted specific rules governing student discipline in the public schools. IND. CODE §
20-8.1-1-1 to -5-16 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-5303 to -5390o (Supp. 1973). It
would appear that if the statutory provisions and the bargaining proposals can both be
effectuated in full together, there would be no "conflict."
21. IND. CODE § 20-5-1-1 to -6-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-1701 to -1761
(1970). The Indiana General School Powers Act sets forth the specific and the general
powers of school corporations and limitations to those powers. In other states, analogous
provisions have been found to constitute an independent source of management prerogatives for purposes of limiting the scope of bargaining. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, - 311 A.2d 737, 743 (1973). But see Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 282 N.F2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y4S.2d 17, 23 (1972).
The School Powers Act should not have this effect in Indiana. Prior to the enactment
of the bargaining bill, the School Powers Act had been held to constitute the very source
of authority for school boards to engage in collective negotiations. Gary Teachers Union,
Local 4, AFT v. School City, Ind. App. , 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972) ; accord, East
Chicago Teachers Union, Local 511, AFT v. Board of Trustees, Ind. App. -,
287 N.E.2d 891 (1972). Further, the School Powers Act itself provides that "[t]he compensation, terms of employment and discharge of teachers shall, however, be subject to
and governed by the laws relating to employment, contracting, compensation and discharge of teachers . . . ." IND. CODE § 20-5-2-2(7) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 281710(7) (1970). If management rights include all powers granted under the School
Powers Act, the effects on bargaining could be disastrous. See notes 33-44 infra &
text accompanying.
22. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4554 (Supp. 1973).
Little assistance in interpreting these terms can be gained from other states' acts.
What little there is may be drawn from a former Oregon bargaining statute, Law of
July 2, 1971, ch. 755, § 3, [1971] Ore. Laws 2110, amending Law of May 13, 1965, ch.
390 § 2, [1965] Ore. Laws 795 (repealed 1973). This statute was the only other instance
of a statutory scope of bargaining limited to primarily economic subjects. Bargainable
items included "salaries and related economic policies affecting professional services,
grievance procedures and compensation beyond the normal duties for which the teacher
or administrator is employed." Id.
"Salary, wages [and] hours," the other items subject to mandatory bargaining under
§ 4, are relatively clear terms and there appears to be no reason to reject the common
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Through the use of this phrase, the Indiana legislature sought to break
away from precedents established under the National Labor Relations
Act 2 3 and other state statutes2" which make "terms and conditions of employment" subject to mandatory bargaining.25 The phrase Indiana has
adopted apparently encompasses something less than "terms and conditions
of employment." Yet it must mean more than "salary, wages, [and]
hours," the other items subject to mandatory bargaining under § 4."
The Indiana formulation could be interpreted broadly to mean any school
budgetary item accruing to the teachers' benefit, 27 or it could be narrowly interpreted to mean only those items traditionally understood as
fringe benefits which directly affect the actual income the teacher derives
from his employment.2 8
A second inquiry involves defining which kinds of "agreements" will
qualify under the § 5 proviso29 which makes items included in 1972-1973
agreements between school corporations and school employee organizations subject to mandatory bargaining even though they do not fall within
the subjects enumerated in § 4."° Prior to 1973, collective negotiations
in Indiana between school corporations and teachers often culminated in
sense meanings attached to the terms under federal decisions. See West Hartford Educ.
Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 578-79, 295 A.2d 526, 533-34 (1972).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
24. Among state statutes, the most common description of bargainable subject matter, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," is drawn from §
8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). See G.E.R.R.
51:501-21 (Ref. File, 1973). Indiana has intentionally avoided imitation. Section 1 of
the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551 (Supp. 1973), provides:
Intent. The Indiana General Assembly hereby declares that:
(d) The relationship between school corporation employers and certified
school employees is not comparable to the relation between private employers
and employees ....
Id. See also National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741,
512 P.2d 426, 433 (1973). Even were the statutory wording identical to that of
the NLRA, private sector precedents would not necessarily apply, since "the underlying
problems to which the federal law is a response are very different from those being
considered here." WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 147.
25. Working conditions are, however, a permissive subject of bargaining under § 5
of the Act. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973).
26. Cf. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 295 A.2d 526,
535 (1972).
27. Address by James B. Capehart, Institute on Indiana Collective Bargaining for

Teachers, Sept. 10, 1973, in
ANA TEACHEm'S COLLEcTIvE

INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, THE INDIBARGAINING INSTITUTE TRANscRiPT 31, 33 (1973) [herein-

after cited as Capehart].
28. Address by Alan T. Nolan, Institute on Indiana Collective Bargaining for
Teachers, Sept. 10, 1973, in id. at 35, 36-37.
29. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (,Supp. 1973).
30. An example of a 1972-73 master contract that should clearly qualify under § 5
is the Fort Wayne, Indiana, agreement reproduced in NEGOTIATION REsEAR H DIGEST,
Feb. 1973, at 15.
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agreements which were not master contracts." While many negotiated
agreements contained all the formalities of contracts, others were oral,
memorialized solely by notation in the minutes of the school board meetings." Since § 5 grants bargaining rights far in excess of those in §
4, the determination of eligibility under this provision needs administrative or judicial clarification.
In addition to the definitional problems of determining what items
are subject to mandatory bargaining under § 4 and § 5 and what items
are reserved to management discretion under § 6 (b),3 8 there arises a
second and more difficult set of problems under the Act. Many items may
be definitionally covered both by the sections involving bargainability and
by the sections which grant the management rights with which the contract may not "conflict." 4 Indeed, a broad interpretation of the rights
reserved to the school employer under § 6(b) could include all items protected by §§ 4 and 5, so that no bargaining. could take place.3 3 For
example, § 5, in permitting bargaining over "selection, assignment or pro31. SMITH, supra note 19, at 38. In only -slightly more than half of the districts in
which negotiations were practiced was any part of the final agreement committed to writing. Id.
32. Prior to 1972, in some 10% of all districts, negotiations resulted in master
agreements; in 53%, negotiations led to agreements which were effectuated through
school board adoption; in 33%, teachers made proposals but did not enter into formal
negotiations; and in 4%, no negotiations were attempted. E. Bowes, The Development
and Utilization of a Classification System for Describing the Status of Teacher GroupSchool Board Negotiations in Indiana, Sept. 1971, at 38 (unpublished dissertation in
Indiana University Library). For purposes of the Act, it does not appear that "agreement" need be synonymous with "contract." See IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13 (1973), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 28-4563 (Supp. 1973).

33. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1973).
34. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. ,STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).
Definition of scope of negotiations and the setting forth of management
rights or responsibilities relate to substantially the same basic issue but not from
the same point of view. Theoretically, the scope of negotiation could be defined
by affirmatively listing the issues which are negotiable with all other issues
considered as not negotiable. But in the absence of uniformity in terminology
and in definition, and with the infinite interrelationships involving legislation
other than the [bargaining act], it is impossible to provide a detailed listing of
all issues which are negotiable.
THE JOINT LEGIsLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE TAYLOR LAW, 1971-72 REPORT 33

The most common formulation of reserved
Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973),
Order No. 11,616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971)
first state to include a statutory management
solely to teachers.
35.

(1972).

management rights is that modeled after
5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), as amended, Exec.
[set forth at note 79 infra]. Indiana is the
rights clause in a bargaining act applicable

J. SEIDMAN, PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCESS 7 (1972). An opposite approach would make management rights illusory. Na, 512 P.2d
tional Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 426, 434-35 (1973). Without legal effect, the clause would then serve only a psychological purpose. DEP'T OF LABOR, SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR -

cEPTs AND PROBLEMS 15 (1972).
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motion of personnel," 8 conflicts with § 6(b) (3) which reserves to the
school board the right to "hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees. 's7 Further, the school board's reserved right to "establish
policy"3 " can be construed to include unilateral determination of wage
levels and hours, which are mandatory subjects of bargaining under §
4.89

Even where certain items appear bargainable under § § 4 and 5, the
presence of the management rights clause in § 6(b) can restrict bargaining in two ways. First, since the terms of the statute provide that the final
contract may not abridge management rights,"0 the school board may be
justified in refusing to bargain over such items. Thus, even if the disputed item is a mandatory subject of bargaining under §§ 4 or 5, the
school board could not be charged with an unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain.4 Second, since the school board prerogatives are cast

42
in terms of rights with which the master contract may not conflict,

bargaining over such rights would be illegal. 43 Thus, even should the
board agree to bargain over § 5 permissible items, the resulting contract
could be challenged and set aside by a taxpayer suit charging that the
school board lacks power to bargain over those items which are also
definitionally within the reserved rights clause."4
The resolution of these and other problems under the Indiana Act
requires a recognition of the competing interests which the legislature has
sought to protect. If it were evident that the legislature intended to give
ultimate priority to one set of interests, the problems would not be difficult
to resolve. For example, the goal of promoting peace in school board36.

IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5

(1973),

IND. ANN.

STAT.

§ 28-4555

(Supp.

1973);

see note 17 supra.
37.

IND. CODE

§ 20-7.5-1-6(b) (3) (1973)

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 28-4556(b) (3) (Supp.

1973).
38.

IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (2)

(1973),

IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (2)

(isupp.

1973).
-

39. See National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741,
, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (1973).
40. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).
41. See IN. CODE § 20-7.5-1-7(a) (5) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4557(a) (5)

(Supp. 1973).
42. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4553 (Supp. 1973).
43. See Howlett, Scope of Collective Bargaining in Public Employ~nciet, in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 25, 28 (J. Ferguson & J. Najita eds.
1971).
44. The theory would be that the school board had acted beyond the scope of its

authority as delegated by the legislature. See IND.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551(d) (iii)

144 Ind. 82, 41 N.E. 811 (1895).

CODE

§ 20-7.5-1-1(d) (iii)

(1973),

(Supp. 1973); see also, e.g., Alexander v. Johnson,
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teacher employment relations45 is best reached by construing the statutory
grant of bargaining rights as broadly as possible, an approach urged in
bargainability disputes under the National Labor Relations Act.4" Under
this approach, if a disputed item were at least arguably within the defini-"
tional ambit of the statutory scope of bargaining, then it would be mandatorily bargainable" Conversely, a narrow interpretation of the scope of
bargaining and a broad interpretation of rights reserved to management
can best protect the rights of citizens acting through their school boards."'
Local control of education, and "the opportunity it offers for [voter] participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . . . local
tax dollars will be spent,"49 is abridged to the extent that school boards
must first bargain with teachers over items of community concern.5" Such
an approach would also ensure that nonbudgetary questions of school
policy which may also involve considerations of political priority are to be
answered at the polls rather than at the bargaining table.5 '
45.

The general statement of this purpose is contained in § 1 (a) of the Act.

IND.

§ 20-7.5-1-1(a) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551(a) (Supp. 1973). This legislative purpose is also evident in the separate grandfather clause proviso in § 5. IND. CODE
§ 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973). Teachers who have already organized without the assistance of a statute may pose a greater threat to labor
peace than would unorganized teachers. The § 5 proviso is the only indication in the
Act, however, that Indiana had already enjoyed teacher bargaining before enactment of
the bargaining bill. Capehart, supra note 27, at 31.
46. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 81 (1968).
47. This result obtains where the bargaining statute contains no management rights
clause, such as in New York's Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law).
N.Y. Civ. Saav. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973). Under these circumstances the court
will not readily find a limitation on these bargaining rights.
Under the Taylor Law, the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions
of employment is a broad and unqualified one, and there is no reason why the
mandatory provision of that act should be limited, in any way, except in cases
where some other applicable statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer from making an agreement as to a particular term or
condition of employment.
Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331
N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972). Lower New York courts have recently abandoned this position in favor of a balancing approach. See West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby,
42 App. Div. 2d 808, 346 N.Y4S.2d 418 (1973).
CODE

48.

Cf. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1) (c) (Supp. 1973), which permits no

bargaining beyond the scope of mandatory subjects.
favorable comment.

This approach has received some

WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 150.

49. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U4S. 1, 49-50 (1973).
50. Section 1 of the Act provides:
Intent. The Indiana General Assembly hereby declares that:
(d)

. .

.

(iii)

the Indiana General Assembly has delegated the discre-

tion to carry out [the] changing and innovative educational function to the local
governing bodies of school corporations, composed of citizens elected or appointed under applicable law, a delegation which these bodies may not and should
not bargain away. ...
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1(d) (iii) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551(d) (iii) (Supp. 1973).
51. [T]he process of public policy formulation is frequently responsible for

469

DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING

By passing the bargaining act, the Indiana General Assembly has
indicated that it deems it inadvisable for the political process to control
all aspects of the teacher-school board employment relationship. Instead
of making public employment relations the exclusive province of either
collective bargaining or political control, it has sought to create a balance
between these competing processes. The generous § 5 bargaining rights,
both in the list of permissible subjects and in the grandfather clause, contemplate bargaining activity over a broad spectrum of matters. Conversely, the narrowly drawn § 4 rights and the broad reservation of management prerogatives serve to limit bargaining and thus maximize community control of education.
Thus, the Indiana Act, although it defines the area for collective
bargaining and indicates the issues to be reserved for managerial discretion, fails to direct the appropriate method of resolution of disputes over
items which appear to fall within both categories. The problem cannot
be solved simply by reference to the statutory language. 2 Judicial resolution of bargainability disputes requires interpretation of the statute in
light of the interests the legislature has sought to protect.5 3
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN
BARGAINING RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

Three different approaches have been developed by various public
bodies to accommodate a positive grant of bargaining rights with a
statutory reservation of management prerogatives where the statutory
language would permit the interpretation that an item both is, and is not,
bargainable. Although arising under textually diverse statutes, these decisions are here grouped according to the degree to which the reviewing
many of the working conditions specified for public employees ....
The task
of resolving questions of public policy is the task of government and should not
be a burden borne by a labor-management relationship ....
Macy, The Role of Bargaining in the Public Service, in PUBLIC WORKEaS AND PUBLIC
UNIoNs 5, 11 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Macy].

52. Succinctly put, "one man's managerial prerogative [is] another's working condition .

. . ."

Zagoria, The Future of Collective Bargaining in Government, in PUBLIC

WORKERS AND PU3LIC UNIONS 160, 174-75 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
53.

Where the legislative intent is.manifest by clear and unambiguous language,

the obvious meaning of the statute may not be enlarged or restricted.
R.E.M.C. v. Pub. Serv. Co. (1966),

Knox

139 Ind.App. 547, 557, 213 N.E.2d 714

(transfer denied). However, where more than one construction is possible,
the court may give a statute a practical application and construe it in such a
way as to oppose prejudice to public interest. State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte
Superior Court No. 1 (1973), Ind., 291 N.E.2d 355.
Morgan Co. R.E.M.C. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,

N.E2d 237, 240 (1973).
stitutes the law." Id.

-

Ind. App.

-,

-,
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In this determination, "[t]he intention of the lawmakers con-
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body is willing to recognize and balance the interests inherent in public
sector bargaining.
The Conclusive PriorityApproach
Under the conclusive priority approach, either the management rights
provisions or the bargaining rights provisions of a bargaining statute
are given conclusive priority as a matter of law. When there is a dispute
over whether an item is subject to collective bargaining, the sole inquiry
is whether the item is included definitionally under the controlling provision, notwithstanding the fact that it might also fit within the conflicting provision.
This approach was applied in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
v. State College Area School District" in which teachers sought to
bargain over such matters as teacher preparation time, chaperoning of
athletic events and class size. Conceding that these items might be included under the mandatory bargaining provisions,55 the court looked
further to determine whether the disputed items were also matters of
"inherent managerial policy," over which, by statute, the schools were not
required to bargain."0 The court found the items to be definitionally within both the bargaining rights and the management rights provisions."?
To resolve the conflict, the court ruled that
the controlling provision . . . is that under [the management

rights provision] a public employer is not required to bargain
on any policy matter notwithstanding the effect or impact that
it may have on wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. 8
Although the statute could arguably be read in a manner supporting the
court's statement, it could as easily be interpreted as meaning that only
matters which are predominantly policy matters need not be bargained
upon. However, the court chose to read the management rights provision
in its broadest possible sense and, without any policy analysis whatsoever,
54.

9 Pa. Cmwlth. 229, [State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd.]

306 A.2d 404 (1973).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1973)
terms and conditions of employment . .
").

("wages, hours and other

56. Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy . . . . Public employers, however, shall be required to meet
and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment as well as the impact thereon ....
Id.
57. 9 Pa. Cmwlth. at 243, 306 A.2d at 412.
58. Id. at 238, 306 A.2d at 410 (emphasis in original).
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deemed it to be "controlling."'" The court thus concluded that "[']ny
item of wages, hours, and other items [sic] and conditions of employment,
if affected by a policy determination, is not a bargainable item.""0
Using the same approach, an opposite result was reached in West
HartfordEducation Association v. DeCourcy6 ' where the disputed items
-were class size and teacher load. Again, these items arguably could be
defined both as "conditions of employment" which were subject to mandatory bargaining, and as matters of educational policy which were reserved
to managerial discretion. The court appeared to recognize the problem
of accommodating competing protected interests, explaining,
[t] his problem would be simplified greatly if the phrase "conditions of employment" and its purported antithesis, educational policy, denoted two definite and distinct areas. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Many educational policy decisions
make an impact on a teacher's conditions of employment and
the converse is equally true. There is no unwavering line separating the two categories. It is clear, nevertheless, that the
legislature denoted an area which was appropriate for teacherschool board bargaining and an area in which such a process
would be undesirable."2
Noting the importance of allowing school boards to determine educational policy unilaterally, the court concluded that the reservation of
management rights "appears to have a special kind of vitality in the public
sector."68 Looking to the disputed items, the court found that "[t]here
can be no doubt that policy questions are involved in these matters .... .""
Notwithstanding these assertions, the court ruled the items to be
bargainable." The "basic question" was deemed to be not whether the
items affected policy, but whether the items could be considered statutory
subjects of bargaining. 6 Applying traditional private sector criteria, the
court found that the items would be amenable to the bargaining process.67
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Note 56 siupra contains the statutory language in question.
9 Pa. Cmwlth. at 244, 306 A2d at 413 (emphasis added).
162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
Id. at 581, 295 A.2d at 534-35.
Id. at 583, 295 A.2d at 535.
Id. at 585, 295 A.2d at 536.

65.

Id. at 586, 295 A2d at 537.

66. Id. at 585, 295 A.2d at 537. The statutory scope of bargaining is "salaries and
other conditions of employment. . .... CoNN. GFN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1973).
67. The court first found that "industrial experience" was relevant in determining
the bargainability of a disputed item, citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964). Of 96 master contracts negotiated in Connecticut, 61 had class
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In effect, the finding that the disputed item was a condition of employment was conclusive as to its bargainability, regardless of the impact that
bargaining might have on school board and community.
In neither State College nor West Hartford can the grounds for
decision withstand analysis. In neither case was a reason given for
choosing the favored provision." A rule of law that one provision rather
than the other is "controlling" within the area of overlap tends to ignore
the problem rather than to solve it, and thereby does injustice to the
interests the legislature had sought to protect. A determination of bargainability should be made on a case by case basis, balancing the competing
interests protected by the statute as they are applicable to the item in
dispute. Where two items fall under both the bargaining rights and the
management rights provisions, a policy analysis which results in one provision controlling for one item should not necessarily be dispositive for
the other.
The Dispositive CriterionApproach
The dispositive criterion approach differs from the conclusive
priority approach in two ways. First, it employs a two-tier analysis in
that the court first determines whether a disputed item arguably falls
under both the bargaining and the management rights provisions. Second,
within the area of overlap the court then resolves the question of bargainability by recourse to a set of specific, judicially created criteria. In consize stipulations and 41 provided for teacher load. 162 Conn. at 584-86, 295 A.2d at 53537. Further, the court stated,
[c]lass size and teacher load chiefly define the amount of work expected of a
teacher, a traditional indicator of whether an item is a "condition of employment."
Id. at 585-86, 295 A.2d at 537.
68. The court in State College was apparently fearful that unrestricted bargaining
would subvert the educational process, 9 Pa. Cmwlth. at 242, 306 A.2d at 412, and may
have succeeded in fully emasculating the bargaining process. See id. at 248, 306 A.2d at
415 (Kramer, J., dissenting). For example, conceding that "hours" would be bargainable, the court explained that the decision to have teachers be present at additional afterschool meetings with parents was nonbargainable since the item was a matter of policy.
Id. at 243, 306 A.2d at 412. Defining hours to mean "the starting time; the ending
time," the court nevertheless held that a proposal that "school will officially close at
noon of the last day of classes for Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring and Summer vacation" was nonbargainable since it was "within the scope of matters of inherent managerial policy specifically in the area of functions and programs of the public employer . . . ." Id. at 246, 306 A.2d at 414. The uselessness, of this approach has been
recognized by the Kansas Supreme Court.
It does little good, we think, to speak of negotiability in terms of "policy"
versus something which is not "policy." Salaries are a matter of policy, and
so are vacation and sick leaves.
National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, - , 512
P.2d 426, 435 (1973).
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trast, the conclusive priority approach does not require determining
whether an item can fall within both of the conflicting provisions. Once
it is determined that the item can be included under the "controlling" provision, the issue is decided."s The dispositive criterion approach, by recognizing an area of overlap, forces the court at least to attempt an accommodation of interests of the school boards and the teachers within the area
of ambiguity. In contrast, the conclusive priority approach allows the
court to ignore the legitimacy of one group of interests.
The dispositive criterion approach was utilized in National Educa0 where the
tion Association of Shawnee Mission v.Board of Education"
Kansas Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether class size,
curriculum, selection of materials and several other matters were '"terms
and conditions of professional service," in which case they would be subjects of negotiation, 7' or items requiring a school board "policy" determination, which were not negotiable under the statute.72 After determining that the items in dispute were arguably within both categories, 78 the
court formulated a dispositive criterion, stating that
[t]he key, as we see it, is how direct the impact of an issue is
on the well-being of the individual teacher, as opposed to its
effect on the operation of the school system as a whole. 4
69. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
70. 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973).
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972).
, 512 P.2d at 433.
72. 212 Kan. at , 512 P.2d at 435.
73. See id. at -

74. Id.
The Kansas text builds upon an approach previously developed by the Nebraska
courts. In School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199
N.W.2d 752 (1972), the Nebraska court held that "conditions of employment can be interpreted to include only those matters directly affecting the teacher's welfare." Id. at
784, 199 N.W.2d at 759. The Kansas approach is superior in that a separate inquiry is
made into the effect of the item on school operations as a whole. This approach is better
in that there would be little risk of harm to the public interest in permitting bargaining
over items which, while of only arguable importance to teachers, have no constraining
effect on school board discretion.
A rough approximation of this approach was used in Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. AberS.D. - , 215 N.W.2d 837 (1974), where teachers sought to
deen Bd. of Educ., bargain over items such as class size and teacher aides as "conditions of employment."
, 215 N.W.2d at 838. Seeking to balance the legitimate interest in school
Id. at board discretion against the statutory guarantee of bargaining rights, the court interpreted the statute to include only "conditions of employment which materially affect rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment and working conditions .

.

.

."

Id. at -

, 215

N.W.2d at 841 (emphasis added). The items were ruled nonbargainable. Id. The
problem with this approach is that the court offers no guidelines for the determination of
"materiality." Compare the conclusory majority holding, "[i]n our opinion, the items
. . . are not material .

sis, id. at -

. .

.

,"

id. at -

, 215 N.W.2d at 841, zwith the dissent's analy-

, 215 N.W2d at 843-44 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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This approach suffers two drawbacks. First, the criterion used may
not resolve the issue in dispute because items affecting the well-being of
the individual teacher can also affect the school as a whole."' A more
serious question is whether the utilization of this test actually accomplishes the legislative purposes. By emphasizing the "well-being of the
individual teacher," the rule may include too little by excluding bargaining
on items that affect the teacher professionally rather than personally,
although the statute literally-attempts to give teachers some control over
"terms and conditions of professional service. ' 78 In addition, the rule may
make many things bargainable which should not be because of the school
board's need to retain a flexible approach. If one of the legislative
purposes in granting bargaining rights is to avoid labor unrest, then the
inquiry should consider how important the disputed item would be in the
bargaining context. While the impact of the item on the well-being of the
teacher is perhaps one factor in this inquiry, it ought not be the sole
criterion. Similarly, if the legislative intent in securing management
rights is to protect areas of political interest from incursion at the bargaining table, then the inquiry also should consider the degree to which the
disputed item is, in fact, a matter of potential community concern. No
specific set of criteria is likely to be applicable in every dispute.
Despite its drawbacks, the Kansas approach presents a promising
first step towards a sounder test of bargainability. The Kansas court
has recognized that the area of overlap has resulted from the legislative
decision not to choose between the competing processes of collective
bargaining and community control. To its credit, the Kansas court has
i esponded to this legislative indecision by articulating a test that does
not choose between bargaining rights and management rights, but rather
seeks to balance the two. The Kansas decision can be fatilted -only for
the criterion it uses in finding the balance. A more desirable approach
would not limit the court to applying only one or a few specific tests, but
would entail a more extensive consideration of all relevant criteria
which are responsive to the underlying interests the bargaining statute
seeks to protect.
The Interest BalancingApproach
A third approach, which attempts to balance the interests sought
to be legally protected, has been developed by the Federal Labor Relations
75. Vacations, for example, are such an item.
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972).
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Council (FLRC). In interpreting Executive Order Number 11,491"
which grants bargaining rights to federal employees, the FLRC is faced
with accommodating a broad list of bargainable subjects78 with a lengthy
reservation of management rights."9 If it is determined that a disputed
item definitionally falls within both the bargaining rights and the management rights provisions, the Council makes an extensive inquiry to determine whether, and to what extent, a decision of bargainability or nonbargainability would affect the conflicting interests the Executive Order
seeks to protect. To resolve the conflict, the FLRC balances the degree
of abridgement to one group of protected interests against the degree
to which other protected interests would be furthered.
This approach was first developed in Local 2219, IBEW & Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, Little Rock District." There, the
FLRC, after determining that work scheduling, the item in dispute, was
an arguably bargainable item,8' inquired further into the benefits of bargaining. The agency had presented no evidence of actual detriment that
would be caused by bargaining over this item. Instead, it based its case
solely on a definitional argument, urging that work scheduling involved
matters of efficiency, economy and cost which were specifically reserved
for determination by the employer under the Executive Order.
The Council rejected this argument, holding:
In general, agency determinations as to negotiability made
77. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), as amended, Exec. Order No.
11,616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971) [hereinafter referred to- as the Executive Order].
78. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 11(a), 3 C.F.R. 268 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
79. Id. §§ 11(b), 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 268, 269 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970). Section
12(b) provides that
management officials of the agency retain the right, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations(1) to direct employees of the agency;
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions
within the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary
action against employees;
(3) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or for other
legitimate reasons;
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government operations entrusted to
them;
(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which' such operations are to be conducted; and
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of
the agency in situations of emergency ....
Id. § 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 269 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
Section 6(b) of the Indiana Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b)

(1973), IND. ANN. 0STAT.

§ 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1973) is modeled after this section. See note 20 supra.

80. FLRC Case No. 71A-46 (Nov. 20, 1972), G.E.R.R. 21:7023 (Ref. File, 1972).
81. Id. at 21:7024.
82. Id.
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in relation to the concept of efficiency and economy in [the management rights section] of the Order and similar language in
the statutes require consideration and balancing of all the factors
involved, including the well-being of the employees rather than
an arbitrary determination based only on the anticipation of increased costs . . . . We believe that where otherwise negotiable
proposals are involved the management right in section 12 (b)
(4) may not properly be invoked to deny negotiations unless
there is a substantial demonstration by the agency that increased
costs or reduced effectiveness in operations are inescapable and
significant and are not offset by compensating benefits.'
Thus when an item is arguably bargainable, the FLRC will demand evidence on both the benefits of permitting bargaining, and injury to the
agency's mission and effectiveness.
Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council &
Naval Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia 4 is an example of this
balancing approach- The union, seeking to bargain over the contracting
out of work, showed that this item had been included in previous contracts
between the parties and in contracts with other agencies, and that the item
was generally considered bargainable in the private sector. s5 The agency
argued that it was important to retain agency discretion because
the Federal Government utilizes its purchasing power, including
the contracting out of work, to achieve desirable social goals,
e.g., to help establish minimum wage floors, to promote private
sector equal employment opportunity, to stimulate the economy,
and to create employment opportunities for veterans ....
..
The agency was able to point to specific policy decisions of its parent
agency in support of its contention that the contracting out of work necessarily involved matters relating to the mission of the agency which, if
bargained over, would seriously compromise the agency's effectiveness.17
Adopting the same balancing approach it had announced in the Little
83. Id. at 21:7025.
In a recent case of first impression, a federal district court has ruled that the
FLRC must make a particularized cost-benefit inquiry in determining the negotiability
of terms of employment. Nat'l Broiler Council v. FLRC, Civil No. 147-74-A (E.D.Va.,
filed Apr. 24, 1974), 553 G.E.R.R. E-1 (Current Rep. May 6, 1974).
84. FLRC Case No. 71A-56 (June 29, 1973), G.E.R.R. 21:7093 (Ref. File, 1973).
85. Id. at 21:7096.

86. Id.
87. Id.
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Rock decision, the FLRC ruled the item nonbargainable. "
The FLRC approach commends itself as a sound method of resolving
bargainability disputes. By inquiring into the degree to which bargaining
would hinder the mission of the agency and into the benefits bargaining
would confer, the FLRC has properly related the facts surrounding a
bargaining dispute to the policies the Executive Order sought to protect.
The criteria the FLRC applies in balancing the utility of bargaining are
derived from the Executive Order itself and yield results consistent with
the balance the Executive Order has sought to strike, an achievement the
first two approaches will not always accomplish.
ADOPTING A BALANCING

APPROACH UNDER

THE INDIANA ACT

Bargainability disputes arising under the Indiana Act are susceptible
to resolution through a balancing approach similar to that developed by the
FLRC. The Act evinces an express legislative intent to protect the opposing and competing processes of bargaining and school board discretion.
The Act is to further "the development of harmonious and cooperative
relationships between school corporations and their certificated employees,"aO yet is to preserve the legislative delegation of
discretion to carry out [the] changing and innovative educational function to the local governing bodies of school corporations,
composed of citizens elected or appointed under applicable law,
a delegation which -thesebodies may not and should not bargain
away

....

90

To further these competing policies, the legislature has attempted to define
areas in which bargaining is to be appropriate and areas in which, unless
the parties agree to bargain, school board discretion should be protected.
This decision inevitably requires a compromise. As one commentator has
stated:
If a school board adopts the traditional methods of bargaining
as to all those negotiable items, then the community which it
represents will be shut out from almost all important decisions.
Yet to the extent that school boards dilute the bargaining process
by involving the community in matters which importantly affect
teachers' working conditions and which state law requires a
88. Id. at 21:7097.
89. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1(a) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551 (a) (Supp. 1973).
90. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1(d) (iii) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284551(d) (iii)
(Supp. 1973).
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board to bargain over, there will be an unsatisfactory relationship between school board and teachers union.9
This legislatively-intended compromise can be effectuated by a decisionmaking approach which recognizes and attempts to balance the explicit interests the statute seeks to protect. Assuming that a disputed item
is arguably bargainable, a satisfactory balance can be struck by weighing
the impact of permitting bargaining on the school board-community relationship against the impact of not permitting bargaining on the harmony
of the school board-teacher relationship.92
These questions should not be decided in the abstract. Only a factual
inquiry can determine how the legislatively protected interests would in
fact be abridged or furthered by a decision of bargainability."a The benefit
or injury of permitting bargaining is a factual assertion, the proof of
which should fall upon the party seeking the benefit of the ruling. Class
size, for example, may rank low as a matter of educational policy. Yet,
because of its impact on school finances, "one can legitimately be anxious
about the distortion, built into educational policy decisions, that may result
91.

Livingston, Collecti've Bargaining'and the School Board, in PUBLIC WoR=axs

AND PUBLIc UNIONs

63, 70 (0S. Zagoria ed. 1972).

Where school boards draw the line, or where the line is drawn for them by state
agencies charged with administering collective bargaining statutes, will have a
vital effect on the relative influence on decision making of teacher unions as
against the influence of taxpayers, parents, and other community groups.
Id.
92. An example of a bargaining situation in which the balancing approach would
be most useful is the issue of year-round schooling, only recently recognized by statute.
IND. CoDE § 21-1-1-62.5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-216a (Supp. 1973). A change
from the traditional nine month to a twelve month calendar would clearly affect "hours,"
a mandatorily bargainable subject. However, a twelve month school year may also be
needed to "maintain the efficiency of school operations," or may involve matters of
"policy" reserved for management discretion. If the matter is bargainable, important
community interests will be shut out from the decisionmaking process; if the subject is
nonbargainable, the teacher-school board relationship will be distorted by the omission
of a key item that helps determine the amount of work a teacher is expected to undertake.
Under a balancing approach, the initial determination to go to a twelve month school
year would probably be declared nonbargainable, since the political aspects of that decision predominate. On the other hand, secondary decisions, such as how the twelve
month plan is to be implemented, may be bargainable to the extent they do not undermine
the initial determination to change to year-round schooling.
215
S.D. -,
92a. See Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen BL of Educ., N.W.2d 837 (1974). All justices agreed that the dividing line between bargainable and
nonbargainable subjects was how "materially" the disputed items affected wages, hours,
, 215 N.W.2d at 841. The majority then
or other conditions of employment. Id. at found none of the items to be nmaterial, id., yet the dissent found sufficient materiality in
all. Id. at , 215 N.W.2d at 844 (Doyle, J., dissenting). The difficulty is that "materiality" is a factual relationship, not a metaphysical attribute. Justice Wollman properly notes that absent "empirical evidence, I am reluctant to engage in speculation or
assumption about the nature and extent of the effect [the items] may have on a teacher's
, 215 N.W.2d at 843 n.* (Wollman, J., concurring
hours of employment." Id. at specially).
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from determining class size through collective bargaining."9 Such an
impairment of school board flexibility, if proved, should then be weighed
against the impairment to teacher-school board relations that the removal
of that item from the bargaining table would occasion. Where teachers bargain over the other factors that determine compensation for the amount of
work performed, such as salary, length of workday and days in the year;
then removing class size from the context of bargaining distorts the bargaining process.
The Indiana statute provides for the development of a factual record
in scope of bargaining disputes from which the impact on protected interests can be measured and balanced. 4 By utilizing factfinding proceedings, the parties can develop a record in support of their assertions
that inclusion or exclusion of the disputed item would adversely affect
their positions. Specifically, the Indiana Act directs the factfinder to
consider
(1) past memoranda of agreements and/or contracts
between the parties;
(2) comparisons of wages and hours of the employees
involved, with wages of other employees.
(3) the public interest;
93.

WELLINGTON & WINTERm,

pra note 3, at 138.

94. Section 12(b) of the Act, IND. CoDE § 20-7.5-1-12(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 28-4562(b) (Supp. 1973) provides that
the board shall appoint a mediator if either party declares an impasse either in
the scope of the items which are to be bargained collectively or on the substance
of any item to be bargained collectively.
Id. Failure to reach agreement within the statutory timetable automatically invokes factfinding under § 12(d) of the Act. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12(d) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 28-4562(d) (Supp. 1973). Factfinding may be requested earlier, under § 12(f),
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12(f) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4562(f) (Supp. 1973), as to
items listed in § 4 of the Act, and, presumably, as to items protected by the § 5 grandfather clause.
An alternate approach for bringing bargainability disputes before the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board would be for either party to file directly with the
board an unfair labor practices complaint, pursuant to § 11(b) of the Act, IND. CODE §
20-7.5-1-11(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4561(b) (Supp. 1973), for refusal to bargain, under § 7(a) (5) or § 7(b) (3) of the Act, IND. CoDE §§ 20-7.5-1-7(a) (5), (b) (3)
(1973), IND. ANN. iSTAT. §§ 28-4557(a) (5), (b) (3) (Supp. 1973). However, this approach bypasses the formal factfinding procedure required of impasse resolution and is
thus less likely to result in a satisfactory evidentiary record upon which the decision
can be based.
Experience in New York City can provide a rationale for refusing to entertain an
unfair labor practices charge that is in essence a bargainability dispute. It was felt that
a refusal to bargain in good faith was not the same as refusing to bargain when, in good
faith, the employer doubted that the item was bargainable. If this rationale were to be
applied, parties desiring a resolution of a bargainability dispute may resort to impasse
procedures as the preferable route. Anderson, The Structure of Public Sector Bargaining,'in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIc UNIONS 37, 47 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
(4) the financial impact upon the school corporation. . .. "
The first two factors clearly give evidence of the probable effect exclusion of the item would have upon the bargaining relationship." Where
the parties have in the past developed a successful bargaining relationship
by including the disputed item, then such past practices are indicative that
harmonious relations can be continued by retaining the item.9 7 The
second item, comparison with industry practice, further aids in deciding
whether the item can profitably be included in the bargaining relationship.
If an employment condition in a school district is currently out of line
with the practices of most school districts, its exclusion from bargaining
may promote teacher unrest. Evidence of the importance the teachers may
attach to this item can be drawn from their willingness to trade off possible gains in other bargainable areas for concessions regarding this
particular item." On the other hand, if a given employment condition
is currently comparable to conditions in other school districts, its exclusion from bargaining has less likelihood of precipitating substantial
teacher unrest.
The factfinder is further directed to inquire into the "public interest."
This phrase is certainly broad enough to include inquiry into the community's interest in the disputed item, the degree to which inclusion of the
item in a master contract would freeze school board positions in an area
that demands flexibility,9 9 and the degree to which the disputed item
affects competing groups in the community, such as schoolchildren, parents, voters and taxpayers.'
A finding that there is substantial public
interest in the item, or that school boards need to remain flexible, or that
the item affects diverse community groups whose interests the school
board must reconcile, will favor exclusion of that item from the scope of
95.

IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13(b)

(1973),

IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4563(b)

(Supp.

1973).
96. Such factors are relevant to the same criteria in private sector questions of bargainability. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
97. This policy is greatly strengthened by the § 5 grandfather clause. IND. CODE §
20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1973). See text accompanying
note 19 supra.
98. See Comment, Maine's Public Labor Law, 24 ME. L. Rav. 73, 86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
99. Metzler, The Need for Limitation upon the Scope of Negotiations in Public Education, 1, 2 J. LAW & EDUc. 139, 147 (1973).
100. The exercise of unilateral government decisionmaking achieves a balance
among competing interest groups in the community.
While government leaders do have defined authority to act as management, the
nature of their action is strongly affected by the need to weigh and balance
divergent interests of major groups among the citizens they represent.
Macy, supra note 51, at 11.

DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING
bargaining."'l Upon such evidence, the factfinder may make an educated
determination of which interest, or balance, should prevail.
Utilization of a balancing approach based on extensive factfinding has
its drawbacks. It does not -lend itself to situations in which a speedy decision is needed. In addition, it may result in different scopes of bargaining in different school districts." 2 Nonuniformity is a necessary result
since individual school boards and teacher groups may, 'at certain times,
face exigencies and employment conditions peculiar to their district. A
fair disposition of bargainability disputes requires the factfinder to take
these circumstances into consideration.
However, the benefit of using a balancing approach is that within
the area of statutory ambiguity, the legislature's accommodation of bargaining with school board discretion is faithfully maintained. 3 Such an
approach would go far towards minimizing labor unrest, for it would
directly inquire into those factors that drive bargaining to impasse. Likewise, it would go far towards preserving school board powers in those
areas in which the boards need those powers to serve and respond to
the public effectively. Unable to draw a precise line between what should
be deemed bargainable and nonbargainable items and unwilling to formulate a clear rule that would always favor one provision over the other, the
legislature has created problems of ambiguity which courts and boards
must resolve by applying the statutory accommodation of interests to diverse fact situations. An approach that applies criteria consistent with the
legislative balance will ensure that Indiana's experiment in public sector
labor relations will develop along the lines the legislature intended.
GRANT F. SHiPLEY
101.

This approach would give full weight to the rationale of reserving manage-

meat rights. But preserving management rights is not the only operative policy.
The role of limitations on the scope of bargaining in the public sector is
that of a device for insuring that governmental functions will be carried out in
a manner responsive to the public will . . . . The need to protect the public
interest should be balanced against a policy of subjecting to negotiation the widest range of issues possible.
[The nonbargainable] areas should be limited, in an attempt to enhance the
bargaining process, to those subjects upon which official judgment and discretion are necessary to insure responsiveness to the public will.
Comment, supra note 98, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
102. Such a result is inevitable in Indiana even without the balancing test since
under § 5 the mandatory scope of bargaining will vary from district to district according to the terms of the master contracts negotiated in 1972-73. See text accompanying
notes 18-19 & 29-32 supra.
103. Cf. Comment, supra note 98, at 88 n.105.
The legislature should establish a general rule requiring the balancing of the
interest of public employees against the interest of the public in issues arising
during collective bargaining and, in accordance with this rule, allow the Public
Employees Labor Relations Board to decide upon specific nonbargainable issues.

